some scholars have stated that group identity and ethnic coalitions from the New Deal era are dead (Stanley and Niemi 1995; 2006; Waters 1990 ). In fact, in national elections there is no noticeable gap in the voting patterns of Americans of Italian or Irish descent, and Catholics are among the least cohesive of social groups today in their voting patterns (e.g. Lewis-Beck et. al. 2008) . Given the incredible diversity of the American electorate in 2008, an important question remains: does ethnic group identity influence partisanship, and if it does, how strong or weak is the effect?
Recently, The American Voter Revisited has taken up this precise question of social group identification (chapter 11) in a comparison of six groups in the American electorate.
Lewis-Beck and his colleagues examine the group identity and partisan cohesion of African Americans, Women, Jews, Catholics, Union members and Hispanics. In short, they find evidence that social group identity is salient to presidential vote choice: "while different life situations may shape the vote in their own right, they essentially operate independently of group membership, which has an effect unique to itself," (311). However the small sample size of subgroups in the American National Election Study (ANES) and limited questions on group identity prevent a comprehensive analysis or discussion of this topic in The American Voter Revisited, as the authors lament in many parenthetical notes 2 . In particular, Latino or Hispanic Americans are an ideal ethnic group to examine in pursing this question given their size, growth rate, and large immigrant population. Further, the Latino vote has been hotly pursued by both Democratic and Republican Presidential candidates in 2000, 2004, and 2 For example, in explaining Table 11 .3 regarding strength of group identity in 2000, the authors note, "unfortunately, this question was not available in the 2004 NES," (312) . Later, in explaining why they do not provide results for Hispanics, Blacks, or Jews in Table 11 .5 the authors note, "not all of our secondary groups could be examined, because of issues of sample size or cell size. And in one case we had to substitute a feeling thermometer measure because the legitimacy measure was absent," (315).
especially 2008. By many measures, Latinos are the ethnic group of interest in American politics today.
In this paper, we argue that group identification matters to Latinos, and that the ANES significantly underestimates the degree of ethnic identification among Latino registered voters. Despite the increase in interest in Latino voters by scholars and campaign managers, the ANES has provided irreconcilably bad data on the largest minority population in America. The data limitations of the ANES make it difficult at best, and impossible at worst, to say anything about Latino voters vis-à-vis other social groups of voters that scholars have analyzed over the years. In addressing the issue of ethnic group identity and voting among Latinos, it is important first to discuss the methodological issues surrounding the Latino sample in the ANES, and describe the various caution signs, that we think appear around every corner. Next, using the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), we explore in detail the degree and influence of ethnic group identity among Latinos. In short, we find that ethnic group identity is much stronger among Latinos than data from the ANES suggests, and that ethnic identification can often be a primary avenue of engaging the political system, often trumping even partisanship. As a result of a large immigrant population, continued and widespread discrimination against Latinos, and new mobilization efforts that encourage ethnic appeals, the Latino electorate embodies the renewal and persistence of group identification in American politics.
While there are several similarities between the immigrant experience at the turn of the century and that of the contemporary wave of Latino immigration, there is at least one important difference that portends major political implications -continued migration flows.
It is true that Irish and Italians experienced discrimination in the first half of the twentieth century, and that ethnic voting pattern persisted for some time, as noted by Wolfinger (1965) and Parenti (1967 Thus, it is important to understand the immigrant experience of this new group, Latinos, and the process of political incorporation since the 1970s, when they replaced European ethnics, as the new "ethnic" group in American politics.
Ethnic Group Politics
As Lewis-Beck et al (2008) note in their chapter on social group identification, not all group memberships drive political behavior. Individuals can be grouped into objective categories, but membership in such categories does not necessarily lead to distinct political behavior (Huddy 2003) . For example, we might group individuals according to gender, and half the population would be said to be a member of the female grouping. Such membership is not likely to translate into individual level politically meaningful behavior, unless that membership is internalized as a collective identity (i.e. feminist). For political scientists, then, the distinction between group membership and group identity is important to make because it helps us sort through which social groups we might expect to shape some individual's political behavior, and which ones do not.
The literature points to subjective group identification as the common link between group membership and collective political behavior. Subjective group identification involves an individual integrating membership in a particular group as part of his or her self-identity, and recognizing interdependence in the group (Huddy 2003) . This realization of interdependence, also known as linked fate (Dawson 1994) , when combined with the desire to address the group's social position through collective action, generates what Miller et al. (1981) call group consciousness. The development of the group consciousness concept has been particularly useful to political scientists because of its application across various kinds of groups, ethnic, racial, economic, dominant and subordinate. Indeed, while Miller et al. (1981) report that the strongest impact of group consciousness on political participation is found among African Americans, there is also evidence that group consciousness is a factor for women, the poor, and businessmen (507). Whatever the group, individual group member awareness of shared interests or a common fate is what seems to matter in order that the potential for cohesive political action be realized.
For our question regarding the persistence and strength of group identity in politics, it is useful to consider the distinction between groups that are formed around voluntary membership, such as unions and Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and those that are ascriptive, such as race and ethnicity. To be clear, both types of groups have the potential to translate identities into political action; however, the factors that contribute to the strength and persistence of group identity seem to favor identities that are ascribed more than those that are acquired (Huddy 2003) . Before discussing a key difference between the two groups that may account for greater strength and persistence among ascribed identites, it is useful to look at some similarites.
Regardless of whether the identity is ascribed or acquired, the degree to which each group influences members' political outlook depends on how strongly individual members hold the group identity. Normative group beliefs, so the thinking goes, are more likely to be internalized by those that highly value their group memberships (Conover 1984 , Tate 1993 , Dawson 1994 ). Yet, the dynamics of an individual's identity and the strength of that identity are not accurately captured by an account that views internalization as a solitary process.
Indeed, group identity, by definition, is a social process. To remind us of this point, Uhlaner (1989) provides an important reinterpretation of individual participation in collective action that begins by pointing out that political behavior is a social phenomenon, that is, one that is contextualized by our relationships with others. Part of the social environment includes leadership, and Uhlaner shows how union leaders mobilize members through group loyalty appeals, and how this explains higher rates of turnout. What is recognized by group leaders is that, "[l]oyalty within a group translates into power outside it (Uhlaner 1989:392) . Hence, in addition to the strength of identification among individual members, ascriptive and acquired group memberships persist, in part, because leaders use group appeals.
As the research team of The American Voter Revisited acknowledges, the role of elites is important, and "political parties," in particular, "exercise a pivotal role in ensuring this transmission of group distinctivenss, from election to election" (318). Indeed, early research on political parties argued that patronage served the goal of categorizing the electorate in an easy way (i.e. ethnicity), which facilitated later marshalling of votes at election time (Moynihand and Wilson 1906) . Parties ensure the role of groups by courting voters as members of groups, and such appeals have long-lasting effects, as evidenced by partisanship and party coalition research that shows how changes in group support for parties has been gradual and taken decades to show real dramatic change (Stanley and Niemi 2006) . Aside from similarities in terms of the role of leadership and the degree to which individuals value a group identity in explaining the persistence of group political behavior there is one key difference that is highlighted in the race and ethnic group politics research.
Two early pieces connecting ethnic identity and political behavior point out that the development of ethnic politics is partly because of high levels of immigration, residential segregation by national origin group, discrimination and economic exploitation of immigrants by the receiving community (Wolfinger 1965 , Parenti 1967 . Although Wolfinger (1965) gives a nod to the role of discrimination, his explanation for the persistence of ethnic politics centers on the mobilization of ethnics by political leaders. The persistence of ethnic politics is a matter of "the intensity of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic relevance in the election" (Wolfinger 1965:905 , emphasis in the original), and this intensity is communicated to voters most powerfully when they see a co-ethnic on the ballot. By contrast, Parenti (1967) contends that ethnic identity that persists after mainstream acculturation is a function not only of the individual's preference to maintain ties because it helps one know who one is, but it also persists because of discrimination. "Few things so effectively assure the persistence of in-group awareness as out-group rejection, and much of the ethnic cradle-to-grave social structure, often considered 'clannish,' is really defensive"
.
While Wolfinger (1965) , Parenti (1967) , Dahl (1961) and others all noted the patterns of "ethnic politics" among European immigrants, few stopped to ask whether the findings were unique, or a general pattern in America. In revisiting the question of ethnic identity, Waters states that "these debates were all based on the assumption -only sometimes made
explicit -that what happened to white immigrants from Europe would provide a model or a comparison point for the experience of other ethnic and racial groups," (Waters 1990, 6 ).
Twenty-five years after Wolfinger's article, Waters concluded that ethnic identification no longer persisted for European ethnics, and that newer non-white ethnic groups were the important observation groups: "so for all the ways in which I have shown that ethnicity does not matter for white Americans, I could show how it does still matter very much for nonwhites," (Waters 1990, 156) .
In their chapter on the role of social groupings Lewis-Beck et. al. (2008) concern themselves principally with measuring the strength of group identification, and are less concerned with their roots. Turning to a discussion on the persistence of group identification in politics, however, prompts us to reflect on these roots. Scholarship on the development and persistence of ethnic/ racial group identity (Wolfinger 1965; Parenti 1967; Miller et al. 1981) suggests three factors will ensure that analysis of political behavior by social groupings will remain a useful approach to studying politics. First, as mentioned above, is the electoral incentive pursued by political elites. Second, in the case of Latinos, the necessary demographic underpinnings of a Latino identity will continue to exist in the 
Latino Ethnic Politics
In today's political environment, group identification is more relevant than ever before. This is the result of a steady decline in party strength and party machines, and the increase in campaign technology and targeted voter appeals. At the same time that parties were losing their steam, campaigns were finding new ways to compartmentalize the electorate into social groups. Most famously "soccer moms" were a contested group of voters in the 1990s, and many new examples abound. Voter databases and consumer information allow campaigns to directly target groupings of voters with a specific message.
All the while, the Latino electorate has been gaining attention each presidential election In addition to the decline in parties and the rise in micro-targeting, some additional trends, and established findings, lead us to believe that ethnic group identity will remain salient for Latino voters. First, immigration from Latin America continues at a steady pace.
This has two immediate effects -one is to grow the Latino population in the United States, bringing more attention (both good and bad) to this minority group. The second is to root the Latino experience in America in the immigrant experience. Already, 60% of Latino adults are foreign born, and about 20% are second generation with immigrant parents. While
Italian and Irish immigration flows were cut off in the 1920s, never to re-appear, this is not the case for Latinos. Next, discrimination against Latinos continues, and anti-immigrant rhetoric and public policy is thriving. The more perceived and real discrimination against a community, the more likely they are to turn to their in-group for support. To this point, Sanchez validates this with public opinion data, and finds exposure to discrimination substantially increases Latino group consciousness (2006).
In particular, when ethnic cues are triggered, such as by a fellow Latino candidate, or harsh rhetoric against immigrants, ethnic identity may be even stronger than other forms of group identity such as partisanship or union membership. Barreto (2007) (2006) found that Spanish language campaign commercials had a positive and significant impact on Latino turnout, however English commercials had no effect at all. With regard to vote choice in 2000, Nuño (2007) 187 and using strong anti-immigrant rhetoric the result was Latinos flocking to the Democratic Party (Barreto and Woods 2007) . Thus, ethnic identity is, and will remain salient for Latinos vis-à-vis the political system for generations to come.
The ANES Hispanic Sample
As the number of Latino adult citizens has increased over the past three decades the The clear implication is that the Hispanic data collected in the ANES are suspect in any given year, never approaching a representative sample of Hispanic voters. Further, the lack of Spanish surveys introduces a systematic bias in which immigrant, less educated, and less assimilated Latinos are excluded from participation. While the advantage of the ANES is that it provides a national sample of Americans to compare across years, and across subgroups, the Latino subsample in the ANES is so poor that any analysis of the data is unjustifiable. We provide two levels of analysis to explore Latino social group identity and how it effects partisan unity. First, we replicate many of the descriptive tables in The American Voter
Data and Methodology
Revisited, chapter 11, to determine whether or not group identity and group cohesion is stronger or weaker than reported in the ANES data. Second, we rely on multinomial logit to determine the predictors of Latino party identification, specifically with an eye towards generation, language, and ethnic identification. Beyond these independent variables, we also include a host of predictors known to be associated with Latino partisanship: national origin, age, income, education, marital status, religion, gender, years in the U.S., and union membership.
The Findings

I. Descriptive Results
Focusing on Latino eligible voters, we report several levels of partisan unity, similar to tables created by Lewis-Beck, et. al. (2008, chapter 11 Overall, we find high levels of partisan unity among Latinos, however Lewis-Beck et.
al. suggest that degree of group identity may be an intervening variable, and we agree. If there is something unique about Latino identity which promotes Democratic partisanship for non-Cuban Latinos, and Republican partisanship for Cubans, we would expect partisan unity to be even higher for those who more closely invoke their Latino identity. In table 2, we report the rates of ethnic group identity among Latinos and find overall high rates of ethnic identity -about 10 points higher than reported in the ANES data. At the same time, there are interesting differences in the percent of Latinos who selected "very strong" as their ethnic identity across the subgroups reported in table 2. For non-Cuban Latinos, 90% stated their Hispanic or Latino identity was strong, and 85% of Cubans stated it was strong. With respect to generation and language, a predictable pattern emerges that underscores the potential problems in the English-only ANES sample.
Among first generation immigrants, 70% state their ethnic identity is very strong, and the same rate of ethnic identification is found among the second generation. However, third generation Latinos dip to 58% very strong, and fourth generation register 55% very strong.
Over successive generations, it is fair to say that Latinos do shed some degree of ethnic attachment. At the same time, over 80% of third and fourth generation Latinos still state their ethnic ID is somewhat or very strong. Language shows a similar pattern with Spanish dominant registering the highest levels of Latino identity (70% very strong) and English dominant the lowest (53% very strong). Given these distinctions, we expect that for all Latinos, across national origin, generation, and language, those with higher ethnic identity will also demonstrate stronger partisan unity -a similar proposition made by Lewis-Beck et.
al. in chapter 11. Table 3 
II. Multivariate results
In addition to the descriptive results, which serve to replicate and extend the analysis by The American Voter Revisited, we are interested in further unraveling the relationship between generation, ethnic identity, and partisanship. In particular, we are curious if the observed interaction between ethnic identity and immigrant generation holds when other correlates and control variable are accounted for. Because of the close relationship between English proficiency and generation, as well as other correlates of acculturation such as educational attainment and income, it is necessary to run multivariate analysis to isolate the effects of generation when controlling for other factors -the tables above do not do this.
We used four different regression techniques to assess Latino partisan unity: two different types of dependent variable, and two different approaches to the state-level effects of our 16-state sample. The four variations we include were first, two measures of our dependent variable, partisanship. One version includes Democrats (and leaners) coded as 1, Independents coded as 2, and Republicans (and leaners) coded as 3 and we use multinomial logit to examine predictors of Democratic partisanship. The second version excludes Independents are only focuses on differences between Democratic and Republican identifiers using logistic regression. For both of these dependent variables, we accounted for state-level effects in two different ways. First, we simply include a dummy variable for each of the 16 states in our sample, excluding Florida (the most Republican Latino state) as the comparison group. This approach allows us to independently assess the effects of each state in the model alongside our key independent variables, and also effectively controls for the differences in state political culture that are known to influence partisanship. Second, we use a hierarchical linear model in which observations are nested at the state level. Thus, our four estimations are: multinomial logit with state dummies, HLM multinomial logit nested by state, logit with state dummies, HLM logit nested by state. In this paper, we present results and charts based on multinomial logit, with dummy variables for each state, and full results for the other three techniques can be found in the appendix. It should be noted that across all four sets of models the results are nearly identical (thus we are left with the task of deciding which procedure is the most accurate for our data, not which produces the most satisfying results!). The independent variables we are most interested in are immigrant generation, ethnic identity, and the interaction between generation and identity. In addition, we expect experienced discrimination to also have an important effect by contributing to higher levels of Democratic partisanship.
As the results in table 4 demonstrate, the relationship between generation and ethnic identity is complex. The variable generation is negative and significant suggesting that across generation, Latinos become less Democratic. However, with the interaction term in the model, the direct effect for generation assumes the slope for low-ethnic identifiers across generation. The interaction term generation x ethnic id is positive and significant suggesting that for high ethnic identifiers, Democratic partisanship increases over successive generations in the U.S. This relationship is best expressed in figure 1 below which plots the predicted probability of Democratic partisanship across generation, and accounting for degree of ethnic identity. The top line is for strong ethnic identifiers and increases from a 59.8% probability of being Democrat in the first generation to 63.6% in the second generation, 67.1% in the third generation, and 70.4% in the fourth generation. In contrast, Latinos with low ethnic identity become less Democratic over generation. As depicted in the bottom line, first generation immigrants with low group id have a 56.4% probability of being Democrat, compared to 55% among second generation, 53.1% in the third generation, and 50.7% in the fourth generation. We note very little difference between the probability of Democratic partisanship among first generation immigrants based on their degree of ethnic identity, however the gap steadily grows across generation and by the fourth generation a 20-point difference in the probability of being a Democrat exists. (In the logit model when Independents are excluded the results are exactly the same, the only difference being the intercepted about 10-15 points higher towards Democratic partisanship)
A strong sense of ethnic identity generates not just higher levels of Democratic partisanship, but a much more cohesive political group. The variation around the predicted probabilities for strong id is much tighter than for weak id. Figure 2 adds the bounds of the 95% confidence interval around each of the point estimates for strong and weak ethnic identity by generation. Most obvious is that the shaded area around the strong id line is more tightly fitted to the line, while considerable variation exists of the weak id line. This demonstrates that, across generation, Latinos with a high degree of ethnic identity are a very cohesive political group. In the fourth generation, 95% of Latinos with low ethnic identity have between 40% and 61% probability of being Democrat. In contrast, 95% of fourth generation Latinos with high ethnic identity are between 66% and 74% likely to be Democrats.
Strong ID
Weak ID
Finally, we find strong evidence that experienced discrimination increases the probability of Democratic partisanship. Latinos who state they have not experienced discrimination across four domains (jobs, police, housing, social) are 6.2% less likely to be Democrats than those who have experienced in each domain -60.8% probability compared to 67.0%. We think there are two factors at play in this relationship. On the one hand, increased perceptions of discrimination against Latinos, and actual experienced discrimination may make Latinos more supportive of the Democratic Party which has historically been associated with antidiscrimination policies and the protection of civil rights. Beyond this direct connection, we may expect that exposure to discrimination increases a sense of group consciousness.
Sanchez finds that Latinos who have experienced discrimination are significantly more likely to believe in concepts such as linked fate and group consciousness, creating an overall heightened sense of ethnic identity. As we observe in figure 1 above, strong ethnic identity Overall, we find high levels of ethnic identity, and high levels of partisan unity among Latinos. Data from the 2006 LNS demonstrate that Latinos maintain a high degree of Democratic partisanship across generation because of the effect of ethnic identity. As Latinos move farther away from the immigrant experience, a strong sense of ethnic identity contributes to increasing group cohesiveness and Democratic partisanship. 
Appendix: Replication of Models
